THE GREAT WAR AND LABOUR'S CONSCRIPTION DILEMMA
The Australian conflict over conscription during the First World War was extraordinary by any standard. It gave rise to what was arguably the most intense and bitter political schism the country ever experienced.
1 And both the outcome of the conflict and the process that led to it were quite without precedent, not just in Australia but anywhere in the world.
In the historically liberal English-speaking countries, conscription had long been anathema. Unlike in all the other belligerents, none of these countries had conscript armies in place when the war broke out. Yet in the course of the war, most of their governments eventually sought to introduce conscription. And wherever governments made this effort, they eventually succeeded, although usually only well into the war and after a long period of anguished debate. Australia was the sole exception. Only there was opposition strong enough to stop conscription from being introduced. The process that led to this outcome was also wholly unique. On two occasions, on 28
October 1916 and on 20 December 1917, the Commonwealth government tried to introduce conscription by seeking the consent of citizens in a referendum. On the first occasion, the referendum was held in an effort to bypass parliamentary opposition. On the second occasion, it was held in order to over turn the outcome of the first. Each time the proposal was narrowly rejected.
At the heart of the opposition to conscription was Australia's precociously powerful labour movement. It was the opposition of Labor MPs that led Prime Minister Hughes to opt for a referendum in the first place, and it was Labor Party and trade union organizations that were far and away the most important constituent groups within the anti-conscription campaign. 3 Elsewhere I have examined the arguments within the labour movement that led so many
Labor MPs and activists to oppose conscription, and I will briefly summarise those findings below. However, anti-conscriptionists had to make their arguments in an environment marked by powerful counter-arguments from the proponents of conscription -arguments that also had resonance within the labour movement. Here I want to examine how labour anti-conscriptionists framed their arguments in order to navigate their way through this environment and minimize the impact of the charges levelled against them.
I have examined their arguments both before and after the outbreak of war. But I have paid special attention to the year or so prior to the first referendum, since that was when the basic lineaments of their stance congealed. . 4 My sources include the labour press; the minutes of key state and federal party and union meetings; the speeches of important opinion formers; the private papers and correspondence of politicians, trade unions leaders and other activists; contemporary publications, pamphlets and campaign literature; the memoirs of major protagonists; and earlier scholarly research. Among the labour papers I have read particularly closely are: the Sydney-based Australian Worker (AW), which was the official organ of the Australian Workers Union (AWU) and the best edited and most influential labour paper; the Melbourne-based Labor Call (LC), which both reflected and influenced the thinking of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council (THC), which was itself central to the conscription conflict both ideologically and organizationally, in part because of its proximity to the federal parliament; and the Socialist, which was the paper of the Victorian Socialist Party (VSP) whose activists and sympathisers were important early opponents of conscription.
developments -growing pressure from pro-conscription groups and the opposition Liberal Party; the introduction and extension of conscription in Britain; Hughes increasingly strident rhetoric; and a series of conferences from January to May in which key Labor Party and trade union organizations committed themselves to strenuous opposition -combined to bring the conflict over conscription to fever pitch. Hughes returned to Australia on 31 July 1916, announced the decision to hold a referendum on 30
August, and succeeded in passing enabling legislation in late September. The referendum was set for 28 October.
The Argument from Liberty
Labour anti-conscriptionists invoked multiple arguments. But liberal arguments were central to how they understood their opposition. 5 These arguments were the centerpiece of labour's objection to conscription from the outset. "An outrage on liberty" was how labour's most influential paper summarized its response to the introduction of conscription in Britain. 6 And as pressure for conscription began to mount in Australia, it warned that "there is no question of greater importance than this. It goes to the very sources of our being. Are we free men? Or are we slaves?" 7 Liberal concerns were also at the heart of the arguments put forward by the movers of the critical anti-conscription resolutions adopted in The instinct of much of the labour movement was to assert the importance of Australianness, while taking for granted the continuing importance of imperial ties to Britain. In its last issue before the prospect of war redirected the election campaign, the Worker complained about a new stamp that "hasn't even a sprig of wattle to proclaim its nationality. The King's head is its main feature and the roo and emu are conspicuous by their absence". And on the eve of the election, it accused Labor's opponents of being the "Hate-Australian party" for having opposed, inter alia, the establishment of an Australian navy. Likewise, the Labor Call insisted that, while "we will assist England" and are not disloyal to the Empire, "we say Australia first". Germans nor the English", and in public he argued that the evolution of that "queer thing" patriotism would be incomplete "till it stretches over the whole human race".
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But as with wholehearted hostility to the war, the wholehearted embrace of internationalism carried the danger of leaving its advocates marginalised or silenced or both. 19 The appeal of Australian nationalism, like the related appeal of the White Australia policy, was far wider, and the appeal to it, far safer.
However, the appeal of loyalty to Britain and the Empire was also very widespread. And it had a strong purchase in the ranks and among the leaders of the labour movement. At the close of an election rally in NSW, Fisher asked for "three cheers for the British Empire". His audience responded with hearty cheers followed by a rousing rendition of championed by their opponents. To minimise this danger, they had to think carefully about the way they framed their arguments.
There were two interpretations of their central liberal argument to which anticonscriptionists could appeal. Each served, in effect, to give the argument a geography.
One 40 Both may have been influenced by leading conservative opinion-formers in Britain, who reached for this analogy from the outset. 41 Anti-conscriptionists seized on this language. Hughes was "Australia's political Napoleon", the "new Napoleon" or "the Napoleonic Hughes". 42 Perhaps he was not wholly displeased. As he crossed the Pacific to Vancouver en route to the UK, a fancy dress ball was held on Hughes' boat. "I nearly broke my heart at not being able to go as Napoleon," he wrote to Pearce. The cartoon first appeared in the Worker and was then reprinted after the result in the Labor Call and the Socialist -testimony to the centrality of its core message and the wide ranging appeal of this reasoning. Commenting on the result, the Labor Call declared simply that "The Australian Napoleon has met his Waterloo".
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The New World
The second way in which anti-conscriptionists interpreted their central liberal argument and gave it a geography was by associating it with the advantages that the New World had over the Old. The social hierarchy and political autocracy of the Old World had long been identified as inhospitable to liberty. These characteristics both fostered and partly depended on militarism and the institution of conscription that lay at its core. By contrast the more egalitarian and democratic social and political structure of the New World was more conducive to liberty. But if conscription and militarism were grafted onto such a society it would jeopardise these freedom-fostering features and threaten regression into the Old World morass from which its citizens and their forebears had extricated themselves. Under conscription, "the European officer lords it over private and civilian alike." In short, it "makes a man a serf" or "a beast" and it "lowers his manhood". was "Europe's ghastly conscription fate" and, to avoid it, Australians must "slay the old world devil". 46 Prior to the First World War, the standard point of reference for these arguments was the United States. The idea that Australia had the potential to be "another America" and the practice of looking there for inspiration was already well established in the early 1890s.
Left-wing reform thought emanating from the United States was particularly influential.
Indeed for a time it was probably the most influential external source of left-wing ideological influence. For example, the Worker and its forerunner, the Hummer, were particularly keen on drawing inspiration from experiments with labour populist politics in the United States. The very spelling of the Labor Party's name may well be testimony to this American influence. Prior to the first referendum, "Canada's Commonsense" was invoked repeatedly in Australia both in stand-alone articles and to augment other arguments in the labour press, 57 by socialist and Christian peace activists, 58 at major rallies, 59 and every week during the referendum campaign itself.
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Other British dominions provided additional points of reference. But many of these had problems of their own. And none of these countries was invoked as repeatedly as the Canadian case. New Zealand was discussed at some length. But this was not because it was a model but because it was a source of concern and vexation. The labour press followed the process that led to the enactment of conscription in August 1916 and its the lead up to the referendum, it tried to contain the significance of the New Zealand decision by engaging in a kind of wishful thinking. It highlighted the fact that the decision had yet to be implemented and the calls from NZ labour leaders for a 'no' vote, implying that the Australian referendum would decide the fate of conscription in New
Zealand as well. 62 Arguably, however, the continental despotism argument had a number of additional advantages. First, social movements often find that a negative argument that focuses on a common enemy is a better mobilising tool because it helps them to unify the broadest group of supporters. Hence the frequency of slogans that say 'no to this' or 'ban that'. show that the premises of their opponents own arguments seemed to lead to conclusions that were the opposite of those they drew. Moreover, this critique enabled them to take the crude allegation of disloyalty to which they were subjected and throw it back at their opponents. 'It's you who are pro-Kaiser!' they could say in riposte. The rhetorical importance of the continental despotism argument can be seen from the extensive efforts that pro-conscriptionists made to address and refute it. 66 They constantly found themselves having to justify the claim that though they favoured conscription, it would be different to conscription elsewhere. They did not want it in its "continental form". Nobody wants "continental conscription" they said. They were for "democratic conscription" not "military conscription", for "Australian" not "German conscription", or for "British National Service" not "the Prussian brand". 67 In the process, they often felt it necessary to acknowledge the force of their opponents claims. Conscription was "unpalatable" agreed one of the earliest pro-conscription responses to Boote's editorial line. 68 Former Secretary Vivash of the Victorian Railways Union, whose letters to the Worker sparked the most sustained debate in the labour press, accepted that "compulsory service … is not a nice thing at any time" before going on to explain why he thought it was now necessary nevertheless. 69 A pamphlet issued by the pro-conscription National Referendum Council argued that "the ineffaceable character of our race will save us from any mischief that militarism may have brought to others.
…The militarism of Germany is a world-menace … British militarism will be a miracleworking wand". 70 Characteristically, this seemed to concede as much as it refuted.
Conclusion
Liberty-based arguments lay at the heart of labour movement opposition to conscription.
They were not the only reasons for this opposition, but they were persistent and central attempt to simultaneously straddle commitments to Australian nationalism and empire loyalism. But it was the public rhetoric of their opponents -and their great rallying cry of 'loyalty' -that gave it particular salience. How could labour anti-conscriptionists parry the charge of disloyalty that was central to the argument of their opponents? They reached for two ways of framing their argument in order to do so.
The first emphasized the Britishness of the liberal tradition and especially the association of conscription with its antithesis -continental despotism. Once Britain itself had introduced conscription, this argument became more complicated, since anticonscriptionists now had to invoke British tradition against British practice. Shifting the focus to continental despotism enabled them to avoid this difficulty. More than this, it enabled them to argue that it was the proponents of conscription, by seeking to introduce the kinds institutions and values that the war was being fought to defeat, who were doing the work of the Prussians. 
